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Abstract The theory and practise of care is deﬁned and enacted differently in
different national as well as cultural contexts, illuminating how differently con-
structed the personal and societal structures in Europe are. A common trait is
however that care work paid or non-paid, private or public is identiﬁed with women.
To navigate in the landscape of care and ethics requires taking into account the
constitutive relation between one’s identity, embodiment and position. The author
suggests conceiving care as an existential condition of life demanded from all
human beings. This will free care from the identiﬁcation with women and pave a
way towards a more gender equal and just society with less gender segregation in
the labour market and at the arena of education.
Keywords Ethics  Care  Gender  Identity  Power
Introduction
In Norway we ﬁnd the most gender segregated labour market in Europe and a vast
market of part time jobs mostly occupied by women. According to Esping-Andersen
[6] it has been possible to combine high female participation with high birth rates
only at the cost of extraordinarily gender segregated employment. The majority of
contemporary Scandinavian women opt for the dual-role model, intent on lifetime
employment, but unwilling to sacriﬁce motherhood. In Scandinavia the rising birth
rates are closely related to public expansion of welfare, health, and education
services.
Is it on this background, Esping-Andersen asks, possible to conceive a society
with a labour market that optimises not only women’s ability to work and have
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DOI 10.1007/s10728-010-0157-5children, but one that also lessens gender segregation? His conclusion is that the key
issue of gender equality (like any inequality) lies in life course dynamics; true
gender equality will not come about unless, somehow, men can be made to enter a
more feminine life course. To some degree men in Scandinavia are doing this;
increasingly they take parent leave, contribute more at home, and they often refuse
to travel in business. This has however so far had little inﬂuence on the gender
segregation in the labour market and at the arena of education. There are still a
majority of women in health and social studies, and a majority of men in
engineering, and IT; a difference that is connected with value and recognition.
Teaching, supervising and doing research within the arena of health and social
work has taught me how difﬁcult it is for female professionals to get recognition for
their work, often also by themselves. This holds at a personal level as well as at an
institutional level. For four years I was elected member of the board of the
University College at which I work. Soon I became aware of how my department of
Health and Social Studies is the least recognised of all departments. The staff at this
department is working more hours and having less time to do research than their
colleagues at the more male staffed departments such as engineering, teaching, and
IT. In my view this is owed to the fact that the majority of the workforce in my
department is female, and that the areas of care and social work are perpetually
linked to women. Both ingredients are working together, reproducing a disadvan-
tage that is difﬁcult to change. The leaders of my department realise that they are
acting as good girls, following all the rules and expectations. Thus, in spite of a
constant frustration, every one of us contributes to the cementation of this societal
and academic hierarchy. As I write this article, nurses in Norway are pictured with a
beard demonstrating that the inequality in wage paid for the same level of
competence is gender biased. Maybe these bad girls of the next generation represent
a hope for the change that good girls shall never experience.
Inspired by various ethical theories and own empirical research I suggest placing
care in a broader phenomenological understanding. Like Tronto [18], I maintain that
thereisnostartingpointforcare;itispartoflifeitselfandthuspartoftheresponsibility
of every human being whichever culture, gender, position, and age. In the following I
will shortly resume the history of care ethics and present some challenges of today.
Secondly I will look into some ethical approaches addressing care as part of the basic
ontology of human existence. Together with my own empirical studies revealing how
power and gender conﬂate our relations and interactions privately and publicly from
birth to death, I shall argue that care is a necessary condition of life. Care is an
ontological given in the sense that to live is to care in the framework of
interdependency [17]. When care is deﬁned as an existential condition of life,
demanded from all of us, it opens up for a more gender equal and just society with
lesser gender segregation in the labour market and at the arena of education.
Ethics of Ontological Interdependency
Since Gilligan [7] the scholarship on care and care ethics has exploded. In Ethics of
Care and Feminist Ethics [2] Diemut Bubeck renders a thorough review of the
42 Health Care Anal (2011) 19:41–50
123publications, discussions, problems and perspectives of care in the last 15 years. In
spite of many differences the commonality between them is that care so far has
taken place under oppressive conditions. The major problem with care and care
ethics is what they signify and symbolise. Care is probably the most signiﬁcant and
important category of work that is accorded to women via the sexual division of
labour, and a lot of it continues to be done unpaid or badly paid—if the latter, then
often by women from less privileged class and ethnic backgrounds.
Care is thus inextricably intertwined with oppressive gender divisions: care is
done by women, it is associated with women and it expresses and symbolises
femininity [2, p. 26].
According to Bubeck the enthusiasm for theorising care neglects the extent to which
theory is corrupted by the oppressive conditions under which care is practised. As a
result the only themes of distortion discussed by care ethicists are self-sacriﬁce and
self-denial. On this background Diemut Bubeck suggests theories of care to take
into account that practise of care reﬂects the conditions under which it takes place,
otherwise it will paint a distorted picture of care. It is necessary to look into
questions such as: the boundaries between carer and cared- for example the danger
of solving the problems for the one in need of care rather than letting him/her ﬁnd a
solution in their own time and on their own condition. Closely linked to this is the
conﬂict of need between carer and cared-for; the problem of the care person seeing
the other person’s needs when they are in conﬂict with his or her own. Together
these questions amount to the more general question of use and misuse of power in
the best intention. More recently some authors have addressed these questions,
however mostly within the frame of celebrating care and care ethics, while others,
like Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen have been concerned about the less
fortunate conditions under which care often is practised which again inﬂuences
recognition and payment. In this article, however, I shall focus on some ethical
approaches placing the questions raised by Bubeck in an ontological and
phenomenological context, universal and relevant for all human beings.
Løgstrup [13] is well known in Denmark and Norway and lately his philosophy
has caught increasing interest abroad. The title ‘‘Inﬁnitely Demanding’’ reveals just
how inspired Simon Critchley [4] is by Løgstrups philosophy of the ethical demand.
Drawing on Husserl, Heidegger, Lipps, a.o. Løgstrup points to the ethical
signiﬁcance of phenomenology and has been presented as giving a key critique
of modern rationality [20]. Being a Danish citizen I studied theology, including the
subject of ethics, at A ˚rhus University where Løgstrup was a professor gathering
listeners from within and outside the academia until his death in 1981.
The ethical theory of Løgstrup is linked mostly to his early philosophy, especially
his book The Ethical Demand, published in 1958; in English 1972, 1989. Here it
reads that the basic ontology of human existence is interdependency. The ethical
demand springs from this interdependency requiring each human to take care for the
Other without taking responsibility from him or her. Whether this Other is capable
of formulating her want or not, the challenge of the ethical demand is that it requires
that I—i.e. any one of us—use our knowledge, understanding and love to consider
what is in the Other’s best interest.
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Løgstrup had addressed it, he would have been concerned about the powerlessness
of the patient and the power of the institutional system [8, 11]. And most probably
Løgstrup would have consented to Bubeck arguing that there are no pockets of non-
distorted caring and that selﬂoss is a risk, not only in the practise of care but as an
existential danger to everyone living in a relation. The concept, even the word care,
may not cover the intention of Løgstrup. His perception however, makes a
difference in the understanding of care. While traditionally care is recognised as
something you can do or not do, care in the framework of interdependency is a
necessary condition of life. Within the framework of interdependency we, men and
women, as human beings, are dependent and independent throughout life. This
differs radically from the tradition that has taught us to develop from dependency
into independent and autonomous adults.
By taking ontological interdependency as a point of departure the question is no
longer whether to interfere or not. Interdependency means that every one of us holds
some of the life of the other in our hand. Continuously confronted with each other’s
lives it is not possible not to be involved, to use another word than care. If I choose
to do nothing, also my not doing or not saying will make a difference. We are
interdependent in the sense that we inﬂuence each other with what we do and say
and by what we do not say and do; we are each other’s authors, to use a metaphor of
Max Frisch.
The danger of transgressing boundaries is always there, because the ethical
demand is including all of us always. In the relation between any two persons there
is a tension between dependence and independence: between the other being totally
in my hand and the other being responsible for herself and vice versa. This is maybe
the most common ethical dilemma of everyday life, well known to all of us. What is
in the best interest of the other person whether she is my child, spouse, client, or
colleague? According to Løgstrup it does not sufﬁce to do what the other person
tells me to do. This only tells that I am not really concerned about the other.
Although I am not supposed to take responsibility away from the other person, I am
supposed to take the ethical demand seriously. And I therefore may have to oppose
her verbal or non-verbal wishes if I ﬁnd it to be in her best interest in the long run.
This way Løgstrup maintains the interdependence from which the ethical demand
springs while at the same time emphasizing the responsibility of each human person
for him or her self and for the other.
That the ethical demand in Løgstrup’s philosophy is unilateral and radical,
underlining the responsibility of each person has been criticized. It is possible to
read Løgstrup as supporting the subject/object system [9] in the sense that the other
is an object left to my subjective evaluation of what is best for her. And it is possible
to maintain that ethics for Løgstrup fundamentally is about thinking in ﬁrst persons
terms [11]. As pointed out by Søren Holm this leaves the health care areas with the
challenge of establishing stable and predictable actions. A health care ethics suitable
for modern health care need not only answer Løgstrup’s questions of how should
I act, but also to the question of how should we act [11]. These critiques are
interrelated and well argued. The balance between I and we is relevant; it is
however, exactly what Løgstrup’s approach inherently criticizes. In my view, the
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interdependency. Each of us is both subject and object, independent and dependent,
throughout life. In other words, by turning the question of paternalism versus non-
intervention into an ongoing responsibility of both parts, Løgstrup in fact
demolishes the subject-object system, consistently concerned about deconstructing
the myth of the independent autonomous human being [3, 4]. Ethics is the
responsibility of I; the demand is personal. As soon as it turns into rules, how we
should act, as relevant as it may be at a ward or a hospital, it is necessary to be en
garde and observant.
The ethical approach of Løgstrup, his claim of interdependence, offers a
productive framework in that it is open to different ways of responding to the
‘ethical demand’ of the Other. Interdependence means that every one of us are I,s as
well as Others. Not one approach to such requests is ethical or unethical per se,
which is to say that it is possible to care in many ways.
Empirical Research
In my study of ﬁve social pedagogues in their ﬁrst year of work they kept returning
to the concept of ‘‘nearness’’; one of them even described that the only way she
managed to work was by being ‘‘near’’. When I asked them to deﬁne ‘‘nearness’’,
and why they found it important, they unanimously said that nearness was necessary
to establish a good relation. When I probed what they meant by a good relation, one
of them suddenly, and evidently shaken, burst out: ‘‘because then the client does
what I want her to do!’’ These informants had, since the last year of their bachelor
study, been deeply concerned about how to transfer ethical theories into practise. It
was shocking for them to realise how they came to exert the professional power they
so determined to avoid. By way of nearness and a good relation they made the client
do what they found best. How come that these otherwise fairly professional
informants did not see their misuse of power in the best intention?
I was supervisor for a male student in his period of practise at a nursing
institution for old people. He is the only male in the nursing staff. He was asked to
attend to a resident, also male, who was paralyzed. After some weeks of his practise,
the student asked me if he was allowed to focus his report on the difference between
men and women. Encouraged by me the student presented a report on a very
successful practise, concluding that it is important to get more men into the caring
profession! While the conclusion is trivial, his report is brilliant in documenting and
analysing how his work came to be such a success. It appeared that the old man was
an incarnated patriarch, resisting aggressively help from any of the female staff. The
student could well understand why the old man’s wife only came visiting now and
then. The student was a mature man around 40; adding what he had learnt at school
to his own life experience he managed both to encourage the old man and to train
him to become much better in managing his handicap. Acknowledging that he had
done good professional work, the student insisted that he would never have had a
chance if he had not been gendered male.
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thought at ﬁrst that he just made it easy for himself. It took a while before I realised
the implications of his report. From the perspective of the student his colleagues
were very professional in their way of working; due to their gender, however, they
rarely got a chance to prove their competence as a professional one. While his work
was seen and recognised as professional work, their work was reduced to care, as
something that any one can do.
Without being able to theorise his experience the male student demonstrated how
care and ethics in practise is constitutive with gender. It is, however, as he indicated,
not gender per se that is the problem. It is the power, the factual and the symbolic
power that is allocated to gender that is problematic, not least within the arenas of
health and social work. The only way out is to employ more men!
How come that the interdependency works out differently for the sexes? In order
to understand what is at stake in the relation of interdependency in general and in
the asymmetrical relations of professional care I had to look out for other ethical
approaches than Løgstrup’s. Although Løgstrup had a phenomenological under-
standing of the body, seeing the body as something we are and not something we
have, he did not address the question of the difference that the sexual embodiment
makes.
Ethics of Gendered Interdependency
Merleau-Ponty in his work on the phenomenology of perception [14], also like
Løgstrup neglected the implications of sexual embodiments. He did, however,
inspire Simone de Beauvoir who in a review of his book declared that his
philosophy has made a new ethics possible by way of abolishing the opposition
between subject and object and claiming that the human being is a body. In the
nineteenforties and onwards, when Løgstrup was developing his philosophy of the
ethical demand, Simone de Beauvoir was developing her ethics of ambiguity. Like
Løgstrup, Beauvoir based her ethical understanding on the existential condition of
interdependency as common to all of us. While unfolding her ethical understanding,
Beauvoir [1] reluctantly had to realise that her intention of replacing the
asymmetrical subject/object relation with a relation of symmetry, with inter-
subjectivity, had to begin with the question: what is a woman, what is the meaning
of the being a woman when she is not seen nor sees her self as a subject? [10, 15].
Beauvoir’s main point is that woman’s speciﬁc ethos, no less than a man’s, is
constituted in a social context as well as in relation to others.
Like Løgstrup, Beauvoir was not concerned about care. In fact I have often
wondered what position she would have taken if she had considered that the main
occupation of women then as well as today, is to care, due to a gender segregated
society. In developing Beauvoir’s ethical understanding Diprose [5] shows how it
inherently presents a challenge to how ethics of care has developed since Gilligan.
Recognising that ethics of care has put the self-other relation on the ethical map
Diprose criticizes it for assuming that the self-other relation is already in place, and
that the identity and difference of the parts involved is given, prior to care. When
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other’s difference can be considered in one’s resolution of moral dilemmas. This
withholds the power balance leaving no room for change. In short, the focus on how
to understand the difference of the other leads to a celebration of women’s
relatedness and women’s apparently shared moral perspective, keeping women in
their place. Instead Diprose suggests giving attention to the implication of two
important claims: (a) that the self develops an embodied and sexed identity within
and as an effect of a speciﬁc social context, and (b) that one’s identity is constituted
in the context of and through relations with others.
My studies [15, 16] conﬁrm Diprose’s theory in how the work of my informants
not only is inﬂuenced by, but also is inseparable from their bodies and their sexed
identity. Their identities—as well as the identity of the client- are ﬁxed and not ﬁxed
at the same time, depending on relation and situation, action and interaction. At the
level of practise as well as at the level of knowledge production and politics, gender
identity, or preferably sexual difference, is part of an ongoing negotiation and
deﬁnition.
There are many examples of how dangerous nearness is for women; most often it
implies a female monopolisation of responsibility, damaging for both parts in the
professional caring interaction, leaving them with only little recognition and
demolishing their professionalism. At the same time nearness is necessary in order to
take the ethical demand from each human being seriously. Also the male student had
to come close enough to ﬁnd how to help the old resident in the best possible way.
Unlike the female informants he does not use the word ‘‘nearness’’ as he is never
conceived as being too near. While most men do not see, or are not raised and trained
to see, themselves as gender, most women feel or become aware of their difference,
striving to ﬁnd a way of working that will be acknowledged professionally. Often this
results in an ambiguity: partly working the way the culture demands, partly working
in her own way (nearness), the female professional often works without getting
recognition, not even from her own self. Unable to relate or implement her practise to
the theory she was taught at school, she does not see her practise as creating
professional knowledge. Consequently she enters a vicious circle of silence, of not
contributing to knowledge production [15, p. 204]. In a sad way the male student
came to conﬁrm my analysis, that care work is reﬂecting how power is socially
constructed within the societal structures and systems in our society.
Doing studies in various ﬁelds of health care made me understand the limitation
of Løgstrup’s ethical demand. The importance of Løgstrup’s gender neutral
approach however still exists. It is as important to identify gender and how it is
conﬂated with power, as important it is underline that gender is not to be used as an
excuse.
Navigating in the Landscape of Care and Ethics
Not one ethical approach can cover the complexity of the challenging dilemmas of
health and social arenas. It is, however, necessary that ethical theory and practise
takes into account that all of us are embodied and gendered human beings,
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our personal and public lives. Thereby reﬂecting the argumentation of Walker [19]
that differently placed people have different knowledges, which again presupposes
being able to see and reﬂect critically on one’s own cultured social, moral and
gendered construction. Only such an ethics will be able to criticise traditional
normative ethics, for having failed to implicate the social context for the
constitution of identity, and thus for how we respond to the most challenging
processes in our society today.
The most challenging processes today are according to Andersen [21] the
processes of othering and eldering. These processes begin when each of us enters
the need of help. Othering and eldering are two different processes. Othering is the
process that makes us the Other, the different one, the one we strongly dislike to be,
the one who costs too much. While eldering is something that happens to everyone,
othering is something we do to someone. Othering is a psychological and a political
process in which we create the Other with perceptions and attitudes, a process that is
not restricted to old people in need of help. By not mentioning that othering and
eldering are processes conﬂated with gendered power relations, Andersen comes to
underline (with Løgstrup) that the ethical demand is posed to every one of us. At the
same time it is important to see and identify how all our relations are inextricably
gendered for good and for worse (Beauvoir, Diprose).
This is most convincingly described by Clint Eastwood in his movie Gran
Torino. The main character Walt Kowalski, played by Clint Eastwood, is a
conservative grumpy old white man who after the death of his wife ﬁnds himself
estranged by the people surrounding him, different as they all are in colour, culture
and religion. He neither likes them nor their children, and this goes for his own
children as well. In many ways Kowalski portraits the elderly man, mentioned in my
story above. Walt Kowalski is not hit by a stroke, but of an attempt to steal his car,
the Gran Torino. A menacing gang has forced the boy in the house next to
Kowalski’s to do this as an initiation. His sister intercedes for her brother and
Kowalski reluctantly accepts that the brother makes amends by working in the
service of Kowalski. With this event the movie explodes into an example of how
intersubjectivity and interdependency works out in daily life. Both have ‘inter’ as
preﬁx, indicating a space between the subjects. In this space power is at stake.
Exposed to othering and eldering, and exposing others to the same, Walt Kowalski
experiences that the self only exists in the complex web of its varied relations, and
that it is possible to change by means of accepting the responsibility each of us has
as human beings independent of sex, religion, age and culture.
Concluding Remarks
Gender identity is part of an ongoing negotiation and deﬁnition at the level of
practise as well as at the level of knowledge production and politics. To pave a way
towards a less gender segregated society in the arena of the labour market and in the
arena of education I suggest to conceive care as the existential condition of life, thus
freeing care from the identiﬁcation with women. Within the framework of
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independent throughout life. This differs radically from the tradition that has taught
us to develop from dependent into independent and autonomous adults, which again
makes a difference in the understanding of care. In this tradition care is understood
as something you can do or not do. To argue care as a necessary condition of life is a
perspective solidly unfolded in the above mentioned ethical approaches, each in
their way describing how every human being from the very beginning of life is
inserted as subject, as a citizen, with a need to care and to be cared for.
When care is deﬁned as an existential condition of life, it opens up for various
ways of answering the ‘‘ethical demand’’ of the Other. From childhood to old age
we live our private lives in a continuous challenge to balance difference and
sameness, independence and dependence. One of the most challenging dilemmas of
professional life is the same: to live this balance in relations and interactions like the
ones between staff and clients, teachers and students. Narratives like Gran Torino
remind us that there is only one real citizen, a citizen who locates her/himself within
the bonds of human interdependence [12]. To neglect this we come to reduce –as
Walt Kowalski does in the beginning of the movie—the world to objects, left to our
analysis, and forget how differentiated the world, the language and the bodies in it
are. To navigate in the landscape of care requires observing and analysing critically
how deeply our personal and societal structures are inﬂuenced with ethics, power
and gender.
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